In this paper we introduce an overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard type in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model. This allows us to study a wider range of¯scal shocks compared to the traditional Mundell-Fleming and to the baseline Redux models. One important policy implication of our model is that the tax cut implemented in the US in 2001 might have contributed to the appreciation of the Dollar vis-a-vis the Euro. In contrast, the imposition of¯scal constraint such as the \Golden Rule" proposed by the UK government can have opposite exchange rate e®ects.
Introduction
The study of the international e®ects of¯scal policy shocks is a classical exercise in open-economy macroeconomics, that dates back at least to the original development of the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model. 1 Fiscal policy, however, has received comparatively less attention than monetary policy in recent theoretical research based on microfounded, general-equilibrium models with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities.
An obvious example of this unbalance can be found in the development of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature. 2 In surveying this¯eld of research Lane (2001, p. 236) , makes a point of focusing almost completely on the analysis of monetary shocks because \This re°ects the emphasis in the literature". The fact that the potential of the NOEM framework to study¯scal shocks has been only marginally exploited so far is surprising, especially considering that an explicitly intertemporal setting provides the potential for spelling out in much more detail, compared to the traditional Mundell-Fleming (MF) approach, the e®ects of the di®erent components of a¯scal expansion.
While there is little doubt about the fact that a monetary shock implies a surprise change in the interest rate, a¯scal shock can be implemented in many di®erent ways. Since the government can use taxes, spending and debt as¯scal instruments, any change in the mix of two of these variables, keeping the third one constant, represents a di®erent prototype of¯scal shock. In spite of this, the few existing papers in the NOEM literature that analyse 1 Mundell (1968) , Fleming (1962) . 2 The NOEM approach combines perfect foresight and optimising behaviour with market imperfections such as imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. The starting point of this literature is usually considered to be the Redux model provided by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) . Lane (2001) and Sarno (2000) provide excellent surveys. Ganelli and Lane (2002) focus on more recent developments in the¯eld.
¯scal issues limit their analysis to balanced-budget policies.
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In this paper we develop a non-Ricardian general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and sticky prices that can be used to shed some light on issues like the e®ects of di®erent types of¯scal shocks on the exchange rate and on other macroeconomic variables, and the consequences of imposing constraints that limit the¯scal stance of governments.
One policy implication of the model is that if a government decides to boost the economy through an expansionary¯scal policy, in the short run its currency will appreciate if the chosen instrument is a tax-cut, but it will depreciate if it is a balanced-budget spending increase. This suggests that the tax-cut package approved by the Bush Administration in 2001 might be one of the determinants of the recent appreciation of the Dollar.
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The intuition behind this result is that, because in a model in which Ricardian equivalence does not hold government bonds are perceived as net wealth by economic agents, a reduction in taxes¯nanced by government debt increases short-run consumption. Since domestic consumption increases more than foreign consumption, the pressure on relative money demand appreciates the domestic currency.
On the contrary, if the expansion is carried out through a balanced-budget policy, the negative wealth e®ect associated with the fact that domestic residents have to pay higher taxes can depress relative consumption, therefore reducing the demand for money and creating a pressure for depreciation of the currency. According to the predictions of this model, therefore, the imposition of¯scal constraint such as the \Golden Rule" proposed by the 3 Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) , Caselli (2001) , Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Ganelli (2000) analyse balanced-budget policies in a NOEM framework. 4 As we stress below (see Section 4), it is not our intention to claim that the appreciation of the Dollar in recent years can be attributed only to the tax cut. We rather argue that the¯scal stimulus is one of the many factors that contributed to the strenght of the US currency.
UK government imply that, for a given amount of government spending, the exchange-rate e®ect of a¯scal shock will be a reduction of the external value of the currency. The model therefore predicts that the¯scal measures announced by Chancellor Gordon Brown in the March 2002 Budget, including a 43 percent rise in health spending to be¯nanced mainly by an increase in National Insurance contributions, will not contribute to a further appreciation of the Pound.
From a technical point of view, the model presented in this paper breaks down Ricardian equivalence in the NOEM framework by combining the Redux Rogo® 1995, 1996) model with an overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985) type. This allows us to make a step forward in studying the international e®ects of government debt in the NOEM framework.
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A model that analyses the interaction between monetary and¯scal policy in a framework characterized by imperfect competition, nominal rigidities and non-Ricardian agents is provided by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002) . In spite of some similarities in the modelling strategy, our contribution can be considered orthogonal to theirs. One important di®erence is that they model a monetary union, while we focus on the°exible-exchange rate case. The endogenous reaction of the exchange rate to debt policies allows us to studȳ scal spillovers between (rather than within) monetary areas.
In addition to contributing to the analysis of important policy issues such as the above mentioned ones, our model can also reconcile the old and the 5 Obstfeld and Rogo® stress the importance of studying this issue as follows: \Introduc-ing overlapping generations in place of homogeneous in¯nitely lived agents would enrich the dynamics while permitting real e®ects of government budget de¯cits" (Obstfeld and Rogo®, 1995, pag.654). Ghironi (2000) combines the NOEM framework with in¯nitely-lived generations of the Weil (1989) type. He shows how introducing overlapping generations can solve the \stationarity problem" displayed by several models in the literature.
new paradigms for the analysis of¯scal policy interdependence with respect to the short-run spillover e®ects on output. In the original Redux framework, the e®ect of a¯scal shock on foreign output is negative, i.e. opposite to the one derived in the two-country version of the MF model. 6 In our model, the expenditure-switching e®ect due to the short-run appreciation of the exchange rate implies that the short-run output spillover of a debt-¯nanced tax reduction is unambiguously positive. Introducing a¯nite time horizon therefore reconciles the NOEM framework with the MF tradition on this point.
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section introduces the model; section 3 derives and discusses the macroeconomic e®ects of government debt; section 4 discusses more in depth the policy implications of the theoretical analysis already pointed out in this introduction; section 5
concludes.
The Model
There are two countries in the world that we label Home and Foreign. In each period n individuals are born in the Home country and 1 ¡ n in the Foreign country. In each period every agent faces a constant probability of death, that is the same across countries, equal to (1 ¡ q): Home population is therefore P 1 a=0 q a n = n 1¡q : Accordingly, Foreign population is 1¡n 1¡q and world population is : There is also a measure 1 of (in¯nitely lived)¯rms in the world, n of these are located in the domestic country, 1 ¡ n in the foreign country. Firms have monopolistic power in the production of a di®erentiated good. Both the¯rms and the goods that they produce are indexed by z²[0; 1]:
The consumption of good z by domestic and foreign agents of age a is given by 6 For a formal derivation, see Ganelli (2000) .
where µ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods. The corresponding price indexes are
(1)
where p(z) and p ¤ (z) are respectively the domestic and foreign currency price of good z: We assume that the law of one price holds. This means that, denoting with E the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency), the following relationship holds for each good
where p(z) and p ¤ (z) are the prices of the same good respectively in home and foreign currency. It follows that the home and foreign consumer prices indexes are linked by the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Production
The total (private plus public), demand for good z can be derived as follows
where C w + G w is world total (private plus public) consumption of the composite good. 7 G t is to be interpreted as home government spending percapita, and an analogous interpretation holds for G ¤ t . 8 We assume that the composition of public consumption is the same as the one of private consumption. In deriving the latter expression, we have also made use of the law of one price and of the PPP, which implies
is the demand for output per-¯rm. Since the n domestic¯rms behave symmetrically, aggregate output for the Home country is given by nY t (z): Dividing the latter by the size of the domestic population we get per-capita Home output as
We assume that domestic¯rms only hire domestic agents and foreign¯rms only hire foreign agents in a perfectly competitive labour market. Furthermore, the only production factor is labour, with constant returns, and productivity is independent of age. The production of each¯rm is therefore equal to labour input according to the production function:
With imperfect competition in the goods market, the pro¯t maximising conditions for domestic and foreign¯rms are given by the expressions
7 Throughout the paper the superscript w denotes world variables, while P C denotes per-capita variables. 8 We assume that this variable is distributed independently of age. Individual and per-capita therefore coincide for it.
and
where W t and W ¤ t are domestic and foreign nominal wages.
Private Agents
We now describe the optimisation problem of a representative domestic agent of age a. 9 Private agents derive utility from consumption, leisure and real balances. In order to make aggregation across ages possible, we assume that preferences are homothetic and separable in each component of the utility function. The endowment of time in each period is normalized to 1: In the exposition of individual variables that follows, the¯rst index refers to the age of the agents and the second to time. Therefore, L a;t is the quantity of labour supplied in every period by the agents of age a at time t, and (1¡ L a;t )
is the agent's leisure.
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A standard assumption in this framework is the existence of insurance companies. We assume that insurance companies pay a net premium of ( 1¡) on the agent's¯nancial wealth for each period in which the agent is alive, while they encash the agent's¯nancial wealth if the agent dies.
Agents can hold¯nancial wealth as real balances or as assets. Assets held by domestic agents can take the form either of a credit against private foreign agents or of government debt. In order to simplify the notation, we assume that all assets are de¯ned in terms of the composite consumption good.
Agents hold the amount of assets that maximizes their expected utility but they are indi®erent to the composition of assets. In addition, Home agents supply labour in the perfectly competitive labour market, receive shares of 9 The optimization problem of the foreign agent, being analogous to the domestic one, will not be presented in detail.
1 0 An analogous notation holds for the other variables.
pro¯ts from domestic¯rms and pay lumps-sum taxes. A domestic representative agent of age a therefore maximizes
+Ã log(1 ¡ L a+s¡t;s )] subject to the budget constraint
where 0 <¯< 1 is the discount factor, Â and Ã positive parameters and
is the per-capita quota of domestic pro¯ts. 11 F denotes total assets holdings of the agent, r t is the real interest rate on bonds between t ¡ 1 and t, M t¡1 nominal money balances held at the beginning period t and ¿ t lump-sum taxes payable in the consumption good. 12 The¯rst order conditions with respect to consumption, leisure and money holdings yield the following expressions
L a;t = 1 ¡ Ã P t W a;t C a;t (10) ; we get
1 2 We adopt Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996) timing convention, M t therefore denotes money between period t and period t + 1, while F t denotes bonds between period t ¡ 1 and t.
Where i t is the real interest rate on bonds between t ¡ 1 and t: Equation (9) gives individual consumption demand as a function of¯nancial and human wealth. The expression 1¡q1 +Â+Ã
in (9) is the constant propensity to consume out of total (¯nancial plus human) wealth. The propensity to consume is an inverse function of the weights on real balances and leisure in the utility function (Â and Ã) and of the agent's temporal horizon (it decreases as the e®ective discount factor q¯increases). Human wealth is given by
Where ® s;t is the present value factor, de¯ned as ® s;t = 1 when s = t; and ® s;t = 1 (1+r t+1 ):::::(1+r s ) when s > t: Human wealth is de¯ned as the present discounted value of potential gross earnings (that would be earned if the agent chose to consume no leisure) plus pro¯ts minus taxes. However, since leisure provides utility, agents will not choose to supply a quantity 1 of work in each period. This is shown by equation (10) . 13 To gain some intuition on the meaning of equation (10), it is useful to rearrange it as
The above expression tells us that there is an inverse proportionality between expenditure on consumption and expenditure on leisure (de¯ned in terms of the opportunity cost of not working). Finally, equation (11) Summing across ages the above individual¯rst order conditions and dividing them by the size of the domestic population, we derive the following per-capita demand functions
where T W P C t is total (¯nancial plus human) per-capita wealth, given by (16) and
Notice that, in the aggregation of wealth, we have used the fact that both taxes and real wages are invariant across ages. As a consequence, per-capita human wealth is equal to individual wealth for each agent. In equation (15) we have replaced the nominal wage with the expression deriving from the pro¯t maximization problem of the¯rms.
It is also possible to derive the following law of motion for per-capita
In the case of in¯nite life (q = 1) equation (18) reduces to a standard Euler equation. In that case human wealth is not important for predicting future consumption. 14 
The Government
Government expenditure and interest payments on outstanding debt can bē nanced by seigniorage, lump-sum taxes and issuing of new debt, according to the single-period budget constraint
An analogous budget constraint holds for the foreign government.
Net Foreign Assets
Integrating the agents' private budget constraint across ages, and substituting for ¿ t from the government budget constraint, we derive the following 1 4 Frenkel and Razin (1996) develop a discrete time version of Blanchard (1985) model, in which money and leisure do not provide utility and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption can di®er from unity. Equation (18) nests the Frenkel and
Razin logarithmic case when Â = Ã = 0. 1 5 In addition, the government must also respect a No-Ponzi game condition. Since the government has an in¯nite life horizon, the real interest rate applied to D t in the government budget constraint is (1+ r t ); as opposed to expression in aggregate terms
where, with obvious notation, p t (h) is the price set by a typical home¯rm in a symmetric equilibrium across¯rms. De¯ning net foreign assets as V = F ¡D;
and dividing both sides by the size of the domestic population, we obtain a current account equation in per-capita terms as follows
The de¯nition of net foreign assets is similar to the one used by Rogo® (1995, 1996) to denote the net position towards the other country.
In our framework, however, the term \net" also indicates the fact that this variable is net of assets issued by the domestic government. In the aggregate the following must hold at any time: V = ¡V ¤ : This implies the following relationship in per-capita terms nV
We assume that parameters do not vary across countries. Therefore, a set of equations that are the equivalent of (6), (13), (14), (15), (18) and (20) hold for the foreign country, together with an analogous budget constraint for the foreign government. 1 6 Notice that in this equation we have replaced the nominal wage with its value implied by the pro¯t maximization condition.
The Initial Steady State
Since the model does not yield closed-form solutions, in order to assess the macroeconomic impact of¯scal policy we need to de¯ne a convenient initial steady state around which we log-linearize the equations.
Similarly to Rogo® (1995, 1996) and Ganelli (2000), we consider an initial steady state in which net foreign assets, government spending and government debt are all zero. We accordingly denote this steady state using the subscript 0 :
In a steady state de¯ned in this way, the initial per-capita values of output and consumption take, in both countries, the following value
When the elasticity of substitution µ tends to in¯nity, the system approaches perfect competition. In that case the steady-state value of consumption and output is equal to
1+Ã
, that is bigger than the expression given in (21), consistently with the intuition on the role of imperfect competition in bringing the economy to a sub-optimal steady state. Equation (21) implies that the initial steady-state level of human wealth is, for both countries
where R is the gross real interest rate de¯ned as R = 1 + r. In order to¯nd an expression for the initial real interest rate, we can substitute the above expression, together with the steady-state value for consumption, in to the law of motion of consumption (18) .
The terms in µ cancel out, and we¯nd that the solution for the initial gross real interest rate is the same found in the perfect-competition model presented in Ganelli (2001) , for the case of no initial debt. This is implicitly given by the equation
The solution for the real interest rate, therefore, is not a®ected by the assumption of imperfect competition. The intuition for this result is that the real interest rate is the intertemporal price of a consumption aggregate, that does not depend on the elasticity of substitution between the di®erentiated goods that are aggregated in it. Although equation (22) is a quadratic expression, it is possible to show that only one solution for R 0 corresponds to a well-de¯ned steady state, in which we have R 0 > 1 .
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In what follows we log-linearize the model around the initial steady state.
As in Rogo® (1995, 1996) and Ganelli (2000) , the variables whose initial value is zero will be normalized using the value of initial consumption given in (21).
Log-Linearization
The set of (per-capita) log-linearized equations that we will use to solve the model is given below. Because of the simple way in which we will introduce nominal rigidities, variables adjust to their long-run values in the period after the shock. Hats therefore denote long-run (the period after the shock) logdeviations, and tildes short-run (the period of the shock) ones. Log-linear variables are in lower cases. The price set by a typical foreign¯rm in a 
Equations (23) in which it was in Rogo® (1995, 1996) and in Ganelli (2000) .
In the model presented in this paper it would still be in principle possible to derive an expression for the long-run real interest rate using equation (18) .
The long run value of the real interest rate, however, being a function of human wealth, is a®ected by policies that, like the one that we are going to consider, involve intertemporal redistribution of taxation. This explains why, contrary to Rogo® (1995, 1996) and Ganelli (2000) , the long-run log-deviation of this variable is not zero in this model.
Macroeconomic E®ects of Government Debt
In this section we consider a temporary reduction in taxes,¯nanced by an increase in debt, with long-run taxes adjusting to pay for the higher interests.
We introduce nominal rigidities in the form of one-period nominal stickiness in the domestic currency price of home goods and in the foreign currency price of foreign goods, as in Rogo® (1995, 1996) . The formal derivation of the e®ects of this policy is presented in the Appendix. In this section we rather provide some economic intuition underlying the results.
It is useful to notice that log-linearization of the government budget constraint (with constant money supply) around the initial steady state gives
The policy that we are considering leaves government spending and short-run government debt unchanged. Therefore we have: ¡e ¿ = b d; i.e. the increase in long-run government debt is equal to the reduction in short-run taxes.
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This result, combined with log-linearization of the long-run government 1 9 The variables that enter the government budget constraint, being all zero at the initial steady state, are normalized by initial consumption. For example e g = d Gt C0 : 2 0 As already stressed, in the initial steady state ¿ 0 = 0 as well. A reduction in short-run taxes will therefore imply negative taxes, which can be thought of as a subsidy. The fact that taxes are negative does not alter our theoretical¯ndings.
budget constraint gives: (R
The latter equality implies that the e®ects of a reduction in short-run taxes can be formally captured by an increase in long-run taxes. A possible solution strategy is therefore to¯nd reduced forms in which long-run taxes appear as exogenous variables. 21 
Short-run e®ects
Using the equations listed in the previous section, together with the one period sticky-price hypothesis that allows us to set e p(h) = e p ¤ (f) = 0; it is possible to reduce the log-linearized model to the two relationships e e = ¡ 5 (e c ¡ e c ¤ )
and e e = ¡ 4 ( e c ¡ e c ¤ )
where the composite parameters are summarized in Table 1. 22 Table 1 : Parameters of the model
q¯< 0 Furthermore, subtracting the foreign from the home demand equation, using the purchasing power parity equation and the sticky-price hypothesis 2 1 Frenkel and Razin (1996) adopt a similar strategy. 
It is useful to notice that equations (43) and (44) constitute a pair of simultaneous equations in the two unknowns e e and e c ¡ e c ¤ : From the discussion of the composite parameters presented in the Appendix, it can be proved that (43) is downward sloping in the ( e e; e c ¡ e c ¤ ) space, while (44) is upward sloping. Furthermore, an increase in future domestic taxes shifts both curves rightward. It follows that the e®ects of the policy that we are considering can be represented graphically in Figure 1 as a movement from E 0 to E 1 .
The analysis carried out in Ganelli (2002) shows that this policy increases short-run consumption in a closed economy. In an open economy, however, the question arises of which of the two countries bene¯ts more from it. The fact that, with¯nite life horizons, debt is perceived by agents as net wealth, implies an expansionary e®ect of the intertemporal reallocation of taxation on domestic short-run consumption. This has an expansionary e®ect on the other country, even if government spending is kept constant, due to the absence of home bias in private consumption. The domestic agents, on the other hand, will also discount the fact that with a positive probability they will be alive next period and will have therefore to pay higher taxes, while foreign agents will not have to worry about future higher taxes. Figure 1 shows clearly how all these di®erent e®ects combine together to determine the¯nal impact of the policy. A debt-¯nanced tax cut always increases relative consumption.
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One of the obvious advantages of using an open economy setup is the possibility to assess the impact of¯scal policy on the exchange rate. In Figure 1 , the e®ect on the exchange rate apparently depends on which curve shifts more to the right. The formal derivation of the results presented in the Appendix, however, allows us to establish rigorously that the situation depicted in Figure 1 is the only possible outcome, a temporary tax reduction implies a decrease in e e; i.e. an appreciation of the domestic currency.
The intuition for this result is that the increase in money demand, due to the increased relative consumption, determines an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The subsequent expenditure switching e®ect, expressed formally in equation (45), lowers relative output. This result should not be interpreted as implying that the¯scal shock has a recessionary e®ect on the Home country. We believe that the case in which both domestic and foreign output increase, with foreign output increasing more, is the most realistic one. In a version of the model with traded and non-traded goods, the expansionary e®ect of government spending on nontradables would counteract the expenditure-switching e®ect due to the appreciation of the exchange rate. 24 This could mitigate, or reverse, the result that relative output falls.
Since on of the ambitions of the NOEM literature is to provide a new workhorse model for the analysis of macroeconomic interdependence, it is a natural exercise to compare our results to those of the two-country version of the MF model. 25 Although, given the static nature of the latter, it is not possible to di®erentiate in it debt-¯nanced from balanced-budget expansions, the e®ect of a¯scal shock in MF is still the relevant benchmark for comparison. In MF a¯scal expansion brings about an appreciation of the exchange rate. As stressed in Ganelli (2000), due to the reduction in consumption that follows a¯scal shock in a Ricardian setup, the Rogo® (1995, 1996) Redux model produces the opposite result.
In the present model, the wealth e®ect (due to the presence of overlapping generations) that increases relative consumption, therefore appreciating the domestic currency, is the crucial link in making our results consistent with the MF ones. Introducing deviations from Ricardian equivalence allows us to bridge the gap between the old and the new paradigm in the analysis of macroeconomic interdependence.
It is important to stress again, however, that not only our model is able to restore in a microfounded framework the traditional Mundell-Fleming result, but it also allows us to do something that the Mundell-Fleming (and the Redux) model cannot do, namely it allows us to distinguish between the e®ects of di®erent types of¯scal policy.
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The analysis carried out so far refers to the e®ects on relative variables. It is well known that a in a two-country model like the one we are presenting the level of a generic foreign variable can be decomposed as follows (see Aoki 1981)
It follows that the results derived in this paper and those illustrated in the closed-economy version of this model presented in Ganelli (2002) allow us to remark on some e®ects on the levels of the variables, even without explicitly solving them in reduced forms. The world economy is here the sum of the home and of the foreign country. Perturbations that a®ect only one country's policy variables, leaving the other country's ones unchanged, will therefore a®ect world output and consumption in the same way as in Ganelli (2002) . Ganelli (2002) shows that a debt-¯nanced tax cut increases world output when government spending is constant. Combining this with the reduction in relative output derived in this paper, formula (46) implies that the output spillover e®ect is, like in the MF framework, positive.
In summary, in the short-run a debt-¯nanced tax cut increases relative consumption and decreases relative output. A naive interpretation of these results could lead us to conclude that tax cuts unambiguously increase relative welfare, because of the higher consumption and leisure enjoyed by the country that implements this policy relative to the other country. 27 Using an intertemporal model, however, allows us to take into account the future e®ects of macroeconomic policies. In what follows we discuss the impact on net foreign assets and other long-run variables. Our model implies that the short-run increase in relative welfare can be reversed by the long-run e®ects on relative leisure and consumption, that go in opposite directions compared to the short-run ones.
Long-Run E®ects
The long-run movements of output and consumption depend on the e®ect that government debt has on long-run net foreign assets. 28 These can be investigated with the help of the following relationship, that can be derived from the system of log-linearized equations that constitute our model
Equation (47) tells us that an appreciation of the short-run nominal exchange rate decreases long-run net foreign assets. 29 Furthermore, long-run net foreign assets are a negative function of short-run relative consumption and relative government spending. Since under the policy that we are considering government spending is kept constant, we only need to worry about the¯rst two e®ects. We know from the previous sections that a temporary tax cut always increases short-run relative consumption and appreciates the short-run exchange rate (i.e. it lowers e e): Summing up these two e®ects in equation (48) implies that long-run net foreign assets decrease following a temporary debt-¯nanced tax cut.
Using the equations of the model it is also possible to derive the following relationship between long-run net foreign assets and relative consumption 2 8 In empirical work, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) ¯nd that the level of government debt is an important driver of the net foreign asset position for both industrial and developing countries. 2 9 Because of the way in which we de¯ned the exchange rate, a decrease in e e denotes an appreciation of the domestic currency.
that shows how the two variables vary in the same direction. Relative consumption therefore decreases in the long run. It is also possible to derive an expression for long-run relative output as a function of long-run net foreign assets as follows
the above equation implies a negative relationship between relative output and net foreign assets. Following the policy that we are considering, therefore, long-run relative output increases.
The intuition behind the results that we derived is quite straightforward.
Following a domestic temporary expansion in debt, short-run relative consumption increases. Obviously this worsen the net¯nancial position of the home country relative to the foreign country. Furthermore, the increase in short-run relative domestic leisure makes the external position of the country even worse. This pushes domestic agents to decrease their long-run consumption of both goods and leisure, while the e®ect on foreign agents is symmetric.
It follows that the above illustrated long-run changes in relative variables are achieved by an increase (decrease) in home output (consumption) and a reduction (increase) in foreign output (consumption). From the point of view of the domestic country, therefore, the debt¯nanced tax-cut has detrimental welfare e®ects in the long run not only relative to the other country, but also in absolute terms.
The desirability of this policy from a welfare point of view will therefore depend on the weight that the government puts, in an aggregate social welfare function, on the utility of the generations currently alive compared to the one attached to the utility of future generations.
Policy Implications
In this section we use the model presented in this paper as a theoretical benchmark in order to discuss some important policy issues already pointed out in the introduction, such as the e®ects of the tax cuts implemented by the Bush Administration in the US in 2001 and the e®ect of the \Golden Rule" introduced by the UK government on the value of the Pound. (43) and (44) it is possible to derive the following reduced form for the exchange rate in which the \debt" e®ect and the \balanced-budget" e®ect appear explicitly e e = 1
The US tax-cut
We already know that the \debt" e®ect tends to appreciate the exchange rate. On the contrary, the \balanced-budget" e®ect, consistently with the Redux result, tends to depreciate it. 30 It follows that, for a given level of government spending, the e®ects on the exchange rate can potentially be opposite depending on wether the¯scal shock is¯nanced by lump-sum taxes or by debt. This theoretical analysis can help us understanding the e®ects that policies based on limiting the size of budget de¯cits, such as the \Golden Rule"
proposed by the UK government, can have on the level of the exchange rate.
The \Golden Rule", that re°ects the principles enshrined in the Finance Act 1998 and in the Code for Fiscal Stability, approved by the House of Commons in December 1998, requires that, over the economic cycle, the government borrows only to invest and not to fund current spending.
The concerns of the UK government in introducing such a rule were related to the need of ensuring the solvency of public¯nances and intergenerational fairness. While we do not intend to take any stance, in this paper, on the debate on whether the \Golden Rule" is either a necessary or a desirable instrument in order to achieve these goals, we would like to stress the (probably unintentional) implications of the \Golden Rule" for the issue of UK membership in the EMU.
One of the concerns on this point is, in fact, linked to the strong value of the Pound. It is widespread opinion that, if the UK decided to join the EMU, a devaluation of the Pound would be desirable before joining. While an o±cial realignment would probably be unfeasible for political reasons, our theoretical analysis suggests that imposing the constraint that current government spending can only be¯nanced by an increase in current taxation can have the e®ect of reducing (or of limiting the appreciation of) the Pound/Euro exchange rate.
From this point of view, the Golden Rule would seem at least as desirable as the ful¯llment of the other economic tests proposed by the UK government, as a requirement to be satis¯ed prior joining the EMU.
32 As already stressed in the introduction, an example of the \balanced-budget approach" that the UK government chose to follow is given by the fact that the health spending announced by the Chancellor for the 2002 Budget implies a simultaneous increase in current taxes. On the basis of the analytical results of our model, we expect the exchange rate e®ects of the UK¯scal expansion to be di®erent from the US ones.
Conclusions
This paper combines the Rogo® (1995,1996) This would come, however, at the price of giving up the possibility of deriving analytical solutions.
we are considering would have a positive e®ect on relative consumption. In order to establish this result we need therefore to prove that ¡ 2 is positive.
To demonstrate this, let's remember that in the case in which the agents have in¯nite life R 0 takes the value 1 in the initial steady state around which we are log-linearizing. Although we can not set q exactly equal to 1 without making the model collapse to a Ricardian economy, substituting R 0 = 1 in ¡ 2 can give some insight on what the e®ect will be in situations in which the deviation from Ricardian equivalence is not too large. Noticing that ¡ 2 can be written as
we can evaluate its value at R 0 = 1 as:
and the latter expression is clearly positive: A generalisation of this result follows if we notice that, holding other things constant, ¡ 2 (R 0 ) is increasing in R 0 (because R 0 R 0 ¡q is decreasing in R 0 ): Therefore, when we remove the \approximation" that R 0 = 1 ; by restoring R 0 to its true value that is bigger than 1 ; we simply strengthen the conclusion that ¡ 2 (R 0 ) > 0: We can therefore conclude that the home country would bene¯t more than the foreign country, in terms of increased consumption, from implementing the policy that we are considering.
E®ects on Relative Output and the Exchange Rate
We already know, from (45), that there is a simple relationship between relative output and the exchange rate. Solving for one of these two variables, therefore, also provides a reduced form for the other. The easiest way to do it is to put together equations (43) and (44), eliminating relative consumption from them. This yields the following reduced form for the exchange rate e e = 1 ¡ 6 ¡ ¡ 7
where ¡ 6 = ¡ 
and ¡d(e y ¡ e y ¤ )=de ¿ = (R 0 ¡ 1)d(e y ¡ e y ¤ )=db ¿ = = µ(R 0 ¡ 1) 1 ¡ 6 ¡ ¡ 7
To determine the e®ect of a temporary reduction in taxes, formally captured by an increase in long-run taxes, let's notice that we already know that
< 0 in the selected steady state. The sign of the e®ect will therefore depend on the sign of the expression in square brackets in equations (55) and (56). With simple algebraic rearrangements, the latter can be shown to be equal to
(57) will be bigger than zero as:
Since the condition for the latter equality to be satis¯ed is µ > 1; that is always true, the term that we are evaluating is always positive. This in turn means that (R 0 ¡ 1)de e=db ¿ and (R 0 ¡ 1)d(e y ¡ e y ¤ )=db ¿ are negative: a temporary tax reduction undertaken by the home country appreciates the domestic currency and lowers relative output.
